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Abstract—It has been shown that as long as traffic sources
adapt their rates to aggregate congestion measure in their paths,
they implicitly maximize certain utility. In this paper we study
some counter-intuitive throughput behaviors in such networks,
pertaining to whether a fair allocation is always inefficient and
whether increasing capacity always raises aggregate throughput.
A bandwidth allocation policy can be defined in terms of a class
of utility functions parameterized by a scalar that can be
interpreted as a quantitative measure of fairness. An allocation
is fair if is large and efficient if aggregate throughput is large.
All examples in the literature suggest that a fair allocation is nec-
essarily inefficient. We characterize exactly the tradeoff between
fairness and throughput in general networks. The characterization
allows us both to produce the first counter-example and trivially
explain all the previous supporting examples. Surprisingly, our
counter-example has the property that a fairer allocation is always
more efficient. In particular it implies that maxmin fairness
can achieve a higher throughput than proportional fairness.
Intuitively, we might expect that increasing link capacities al-
ways raises aggregate throughput. We show that not only can
throughput be reduced when some link increases its capacity,
more strikingly, it can also be reduced when all links increase their
capacities by the same amount. If all links increase their capacities
proportionally, however, throughput will indeed increase. These
examples demonstrate the intricate interactions among sources in
a network setting that are missing in a single-link topology.
Index Terms—Fairness, flow control, optimization, throughput.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Acentral issue in networking is how to allocate bandwidthto flows efficiently and fairly, in a decentralized manner.
A series of recent work, e.g., [18], [22]–[25], [28], [34], has
shown that a bandwidth allocation policy can be expressed in
terms of a utility function in the sense that the desired
bandwidth allocation all sources solves the utility
maximization problem formulated in [18]:
subject to link capacity constraints (1)
It is remarkable that as long as traffic sources adapt their rates to
the aggregate congestion measure in their paths, they are implic-
itly maximizing some utility.1 Hence, the optimization problem
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1Provided that they all react to the same congestion price, possibly in different
ways, see [32] otherwise.
(1) is a convenient characterization of many networks under end-
to-endcontrol,suchasnetworkscontrolledbyTransmissionCon-
trol Protocol (TCP). Indeed, one can derive the utility functions
that are implicitly solved by the various TCP congestion control
algorithms proposed in the literature [23], [25]. In this paper we
study some counter-intuitive behaviors of such networks.
A common figure of merit is the aggregate throughput .
It measures the total traffic through the network and, in this
sense, the efficiency of the bandwidth allocation policy under
which the network operates.2 If users pay a constant charge
per unit bandwidth, the aggregate throughput is also propor-
tional to network revenue. How do we balance fairness and
aggregate throughput in designing bandwidth allocation poli-
cies? Will adding additional link capacities necessarily result
in higher aggregate throughput? There are many examples in
the literature that point to an inevitable tradeoff between fair-
ness and aggregate throughput (see Section IV-A and IV-B),
yet, we cannot find a general theorem clarifying this folklore. In
this paper we provide an answer to both problems. The second
problem also provides insight on where to invest capacity to best
improve network efficiency or revenue.
Our emphasis is on general networks with multiple links and
on mathematical analysis. Often, interesting and counter-intu-
itive behaviors arise only in a network setting where sources
interact through multiple shared links in intricate and surprising
ways. Such behaviors are absent in a single-link topology. The
discovery of some of these behaviors, and their explanation,
demonstrate that the formal approach taken here is indeed nec-
essary and rewarding.
We now summarize our main results.
B. Summary
Suppose all policies (utility functions ) are parameterized
by a common scalar . We first derive explicit expressions
for the changes in throughputs and prices when the parameter
or the capacities change (Theorem 2). Here, the prices are the
Lagrange multipliers of the utility maximization problem [24].
This result applies to general utility functions.
We then specialize to a particular class of utility functions
proposed in [28] that turns out to characterize various TCP
variants and includes various fairness notions proposed in
the networking literature as special cases (see Section IV-A).
Following [3] and [27], we interpret the parameter as a quan-
titative measure of fairness in the sense that a fairer allocation
is one with a larger . All examples we can find in the literature
indicate that a fair allocation is necessarily inefficient, i.e.,
2This notion of efficiency is different from Pareto optimality commonly used
in economics.
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an allocation policy with a larger seems to always lead to
a smaller aggregate throughput. We characterize exactly the
tradeoff between fairness and throughput in general networks
(Theorem 5). The characterization allows us both to produce
the first counter-example (Theorem 8) and trivially explain all
the previous supporting examples (Corollary 6). Surprisingly,
in our counter-example, a fairer allocation is always more effi-
cient. In particular it implies that maxmin fairness can achieve
a higher aggregate throughput than proportional fairness.
Intuitively, we might expect that the aggregate throughput
will always rise as long as some links increase their capacities
and no links decrease theirs. This turns out not to be the case,
and we characterize exactly the condition under which this is
true (Theorem 9). Not only can the aggregate throughput be re-
duced when some link increases its capacity, more strikingly, it
can also be reduced even when all links increase their capacities
by the same amount (Theorem 11). Moreover, this holds under
all bandwidth allocation policies (fairness ). This paradoxical
result seems less surprising in retrospect: raising link capacities
always increases the aggregate utility, but mathematically there
is no a priori reason that it should also increase the aggregate
throughput. If all links increase their capacities proportionally,
however, the aggregate throughput will indeed increase, for the
class of utility functions proposed in [28] (Theorem 12).
It is well-known that counter-intuitive behavior can arise in
a distributed system where agents optimize their own objec-
tives. The earliest and the most famous example is the Braess
paradox in transportation networks, discovered theoretically in
1968 (see, e.g., [4], [11], [29]) and widely verified in the real
world years later, e.g., [7]. There the addition of a new road seg-
ment to a network changes the traffic flow to a new equilibrium
in which every car incurs a longer travel time. Subsequent para-
doxes have been discovered in mechanical and electrical net-
works [8], in queueing networks [1], [6], [9], [20], [21], and
in computer systems [16], [17]. Even though our results have
the same flavor, they differ in important ways from the Braess
paradox. First, in Braess paradox, the performance degradation
is due to misalignment of individual and social optimalities. In
our case, even though TCP sources also selfishly optimize their
own net benefits (e.g., [24]), congestion prices align their in-
dividual optimalities with social optimality. The performance
degradation in our case is due to misalignment of two social ob-
jectives (utility maximization versus throughput maximization).
Second, in Braess paradox, the addition of new capacity (path)
leads to degraded performance for all flows, and hence the new
equilibrium point is not Pareto optimal. In our case, all equilib-
rium points are Pareto optimal, and hence some flows are worse
off and some better off in the new equilibrium point. The con-
ventional wisdom is that the addition of capacity should change
the equilibrium to a new point where the aggregate throughput
should be at least as high. Our results show that while this is
true for simple networks, it does not always hold in general net-
works. Finally, examples of Braess paradox always involve the
addition of new paths and flows that re-route to maximize their
own objectives. In our case, only link capacities are changed,
while network topology and routing are fixed.
The paper is organized as follows. We describe in Section II
our model. We establish in Section III the basic results on the ef-
fect of parameter and link capacities on equilibrium through-
puts and prices. We study in Section IV whether a fair allocation
is always inefficient, and in Section V whether increasing ca-
pacity always raises aggregate throughput. We conclude in Sec-
tion VI with limitations of this work. Partial and preliminary
results have appeared in [31], which also provides alternative
proofs for some of the results in Section IV.
II. MODEL
Consider a network of links, indexed by , with finite ca-
pacities . It is shared by sources, indexed by . Let be the
routing matrix: if source uses link and 0 oth-
erwise. Let be the transmission rate of source , and
be its utility as a function of its rate . Suppose all the utility
functions are parameterized by a scalar . Sup-
pose are concave in for and strictly con-
cave when . When and are clear from the context, we
may use in place of . In general, denotes the
vector when are previously defined, and
denotes transpose. We use to denote natural logarithm.
Consider the utility maximization problem defined in [18]:
subject to (2)
and its Lagrangian dual [24]:
(3)
By duality theory, a maximizer for (2) and a mini-
mizer (Lagrange multiplier) for (3) exist for ,
. Moreover, is unique if when the utility functions
are strictly concave. We will call a dual optimal solution the
link prices (see e.g., [24] for interpretation).
Unless otherwise specified, we will assume that so that
the utility functions are strictly concave and the optimal solution
denoted by is unique. The aggregate throughput
is defined in terms of the unique solution
(4)
From Lemma 1, is a continuous function of and .
Moreover, is differentiable except at a finite number of
points when the active constraint set at optimal changes
as or is perturbed. Hence, we can study and
in between these points.3 For the rest of the paper, we will thus
focus on the utility maximization with equality constraints that
represent only those constraints that are active at optimality:
s.t. (5)
In this case the dual problem (3) should be interpreted as the
Lagrangian dual of (2) with a possibly reduced , as opposed
3Hence, all our statements below on @T=@ and @T=@c should be inter-
preted piecewise in between nondifferentiable points of  and c.
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to the dual of (5).4 If every link has a single-link flow, then all
constraints are necessarily tight.
Suppose the routing matrix has full row rank. Sup-
pose and let be the difference be-
tween the number of sources and the number of links. Then
is the dimension of the null space of . Let ( ,
), , be any basis of the null space of , and let
be the matrix with as its columns. Let
be the aggregate utility func-
tion. Let denote the curvature of the aggregate
utility function
(6)
and be
(7)
at the optimal allocation .
III. BASIC RESULTS
We start with an important property of , quoted di-
rectly from [33].
Lemma 1: For any , , the unique solution
of (5) is continuous and differentiable at .
Here, we have used the assumption that the considered
throughout this paper is such that the active constraint set is
unchanged when or is perturbed locally [i.e., we consider
problem (5) instead of problem (2)], so that is independent
of .
The basic results on how throughputs and prices vary as
the utility parameter and capacity change are given in the
next theorem. These results apply to general utility functions.
In the next two sections, we will specialize to a particular
class of utility functions to study throughput–fairness tradeoff
and whether increasing capacity always raises aggregate
throughput.
Theorem 2: The optimal rates of (5) and optimal
prices of (3) satisfy the following equations:
where matrix and vector are defined in (6) and (7), respec-
tively.
Proof: At the optimal point, the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker
condition holds. We have
and (8)
4To be precise, the routing matrix R in both (5) and (3) should be denoted
R(; c) to indicate that it consists only of “bottleneck” links at the given (; c),
but we will abuse notation to use R to denote both the full routing matrix and
the reduced matrix when there is no danger of confusion.
Define
and
Then (8) can be rewritten as . The derivatives of
function are
Since is full row rank and is positive definite,
is positive definite. Then is always invertible, and it can
be checked that
where
All the above matrices are well defined because is
invertible. From the implicit function theorem, the vector can
be uniquely solved in terms of locally. Moreover
From the definitions of and , we have
Substituting in the definitions of yields the desired results.
Since the optimal always satisfies the constraints ,
for a fixed , the change in should be in the null space of as
varies. This is captured by the following corollary.
Corollary 3: The derivative can also be expressed as
where the columns of matrix form a basis of the null space
of .
Proof: Let
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From Theorem 2 and the definition of , we only need to show
. By the definition of matrix we have
and
It is clear that
The next step is to show that the matrix is full rank so that
must be the zero matrix. Suppose it is not, then there exists a
nonzero vector such that
(9)
Hence, , i.e., is in the null space of . Since the
columns of form a basis of the null space of , there exists
such that Substituting into (9), we have
Since is positive definite and invertible, we must have
and . This contradicts the assumption that
. Therefore, is full rank and .
We now apply these results to a particular class of utility func-
tions to study the effect of changes in and on aggregate
throughput in general networks.
IV. IS FAIR ALLOCATION ALWAYS INEFFICIENT
In this section, we apply the expression for in
Corollary 3 to study the effect of changes in on aggregate
throughput , for a fixed . It clarifies
a folklore about tradeoff between efficiency and fairness of
a bandwidth allocation policy. We first define a quantitative
measure of fairness and state formally the conjecture.
A. Conjecture
A series of recent work, e.g., [18], [22]–[25], [28] has
shown that a bandwidth allocation policy can be expressed in
terms of a utility function in the sense that the desired
bandwidth allocation solves problem (2), and the associated
price vector solves (3). Indeed, various TCP congestion
control algorithms can be interpreted as solving the same utility
maximization problem, and its dual [24], with different utility
functions [23], [25]. The authors of [18] introduce proportional
fairness, characterized by . In [27], an alloca-
tion policy called minimum potential delay is proposed with
, which is shown in [22] to approximate the
fairness of the TCP Reno deployed on the current Internet. In
[28], the following class of utility functions is proposed:
if
if
(10)
for . This includes all the previously considered allocation
policies as special cases—maximum throughput , pro-
portional fairness , minimum potential delay ,
and maxmin fairness —and provides a convenient way
to compare the fairness of different allocation policies. More-
over, it also includes the fairness of major TCP congestion con-
trol algorithms, Reno , HSTCP [10] , and
Vegas [25], FAST [15], STCP [19] ( for all), as special
cases. See [3] for application of this class of utility functions to
study the effect of fairness on stability of a dynamic network
where sources randomly join and depart.
The above discussion suggests the interpretation of as a
quantitative measure of fairness. Note that we are not concerned
with fairness across different flows under the same allocation
policy represented by a given value, as, e.g., Jain’s fairness
index is [14]. Rather, we want to compare fairness across allo-
cation policies. While there are no generally accepted criteria to
compare the fairness of allocation policies, many examples in
the networking literature (e.g., [3], [26]–[28], [30]) informally
compare specific allocation policies in terms of their . For in-
stance, the choice of maximizes throughput but can
be extremely unfair (see Example 1 below). Proportional fairness
is considered fairer, and maxmin fairness the
fairest because it generalizes equal sharing at a single resource to
a network of resources in a way that maintains Pareto optimality
[2], [12]. Indeed, for the linear network in Example 1 below,
[27] explicitly compares the fairness of these policies, and shows
that the minimum-potential-delay policy “penalizes
more (less) severely long routes than maxmin (proportional)
fairness.” Here, we extrapolate this intuition from these special
cases to a continuum of allocation policies, indexed by ,
and interpret as a quantitative measure of fairness. We will
also provide shortly a technical reason for this extrapolation.
For the rest of this paper, we assume that all sources use the
common utility function given by (10) with the same .
This assumption is made both for analytical simplicity and to
focus our attention on behaviors that arise from the fairness of
allocation policies, not from source heterogeneity.
Is a fairer policy (one with larger ) always less efficient
(has a smaller aggregate throughput )? This conjecture is
prompted by the various examples in resource allocation in the
literature of wired networks [3], [27], [28], wireless networks,
[26], [30], economics, [5], etc. (also see the next subsection).
These examples seem to illustrate (quoted from [26])
“the fundamental conflict between achieving flow fair-
ness and maximizing overall system throughput. The
basic issue is thus the tradeoff between these two con-
flicting criteria.”
Formally, we have
Conjecture 4: is nonincreasing:
for
B. Special Cases
In this subsection, we review several examples in the lit-
erature that have motivated the conjecture. The conjecture
is shown to be true in special networks for maxmin fair-
ness, minimum potential delay, proportional fairness, and the
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Fig. 1. Linear network.
maximum-throughput policy, by analytically solving (2) or nu-
merically computing . These techniques are not applicable
to general networks specified by arbitrary . By interpo-
lating the space of allocation policies to a continuum indexed
by , we can apply implicit function theorem to compare these
allocation policies in general networks.
As we will explain in the next subsection, the underlying net-
work topology in all the examples in this subsection possesses
a special structure that is far from apparent in previous analysis
but that leads to trivial sufficient conditions for the conjecture
to be true; see the discussion preceding Corollary 6.
Example 1: Linear Network With Uniform Capacity [3],
[27]: Consider the classical linear network with links,
indexed by , and sources, indexed by
, shown in Fig. 1. Source 0 goes through all the
links and sources go through links . All links have
the same capacity of 1 unit.
In [27], the throughput of each source and their aggregate
have been calculated for several values:
maxmin fairness
min potential delay
proportional fairness
max throughput
Hence, the conjecture is true for these specific values of :
After examining this special case, the authors of [27] made a
cautious comment: “It is not known whether the same ordering
holds for arbitrary network topologies.”
Is the conjecture true for other values of for this topology?
In [3], the rates are computed by solving (2), as follows:
Using this, we can easily check that, for ,
Hence, except for the single link case , is
strictly decreasing in for the linear network with uniform link
capacity.
Example 2: Linear Network With Nonuniform Capacity [28]:
The linear network of Example 1 is considered in [28] with
Fig. 2. Linear network with two long flows.
Fig. 3. Fairness–efficiency tradeoff T (): linear network with two long flows.
, but with different link capacities . The authors
calculated the source rates under maxmin fairness:
and pointed out that source rate will be higher under propor-
tional fairness, highlighting the fact that different fairness cri-
teria can produce different throughput in general networks.
Indeed, it is not hard to solve (2) directly to obtain the source
rates under proportional fairness for this example:
Hence,
The throughputs for proportional and maxmin fairness support
the conjecture for and .
Example 3: Linear Network With Two Long Flows: Consider
a linear network with two long flows, as shown in Fig. 2. We
choose and numerically solve
for for . The result is shown in Fig. 3. It suggests that
the conjecture is true for all for this network. Corollary 6
below implies that, indeed, it is.
We now investigate the conjecture in general networks.
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C. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
In this subsection, we will abuse notation and use to denote
both a function of , as before, and a function of source rates
:
(11)
where . The meaning should be clear from the
context. From Corollary 3, we have that
(12)
When the utility function is defined as in (10) the matrix
and vector defined in (6) and (7), respectively, take the forms
where are the optimal rates. Let
, , and be defined by
(13)
where are the th columns of . Note that is positive def-
inite and hence invertible. Let denote the matrix ob-
tained from replacing the th row of with row vector
. From the above definitions and (12) we have
(14)
Our first main result is a necessary and sufficient condition
for the conjecture to hold. Note that the condition is a function
of even though this is not explicit in the notation.
Theorem 5: For any
if and only if
Proof: The key observation is the following expression for
the row vector:
(15)
which follows from the following formula for matrix inverse
[13]:
where is the adjoint matrix of . Combining (14) and (15),
we have
Theorem 5 characterizes exactly the set of networks
in which Conjecture 4 is true. Though difficult to understand
intuitively, this characterization leads directly to two sufficient
conditions that explain all the examples in Section IV-B. The
first condition implies that the conjecture is true when every link
has a single-link flow and there is only one long flow. This con-
dition is satisfied by Examples 1 and 2. The second condition
implies that the conjecture is true when there are two long flows
but both pass through the same number of links. This condition
is satisfied by Example 3. The corollary implies that, while the
diversity of capacities in Examples 2 and 3 makes the op-
timization problem (2) hard to solve and the previous analysis
methods complicated, they are not relevant at all to the truth of
the conjecture for these examples.
Corollary 6: Suppose every link has a single-link flow.
1) If , then for all .
2) If and the only two long flows pass through
the same number of links, then for all .
To prove the corollary, we now specialize to a particular basis
of the null space of the routing matrix , making use of the
fact that every link has a single-link flow. Rearrange the column
of routing matrix to express as
where is the identity matrix and is a matrix,
. We choose a set of basis for the null space of
such that matrix can be expressed as
(16)
Clearly .
Lemma 7: Suppose every link has a single-link flow. For
in the form of (16), we have
1) for .
2) for all .
Proof: The Karush–Kuhn–Tucker condition implies that
there are nonnegative such that (see e.g., [24])
By definition, . Hence, we have
(17)
From (10),
Suppose is the th row of matrix .
Then (16), (10), and (17) imply that, for
(18)
Since is a 0–1 matrix, we have or 1, .
Hence, and
for (19)
From (7), is
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Then, for ,
where the last equality follows from (18) and the inequality fol-
lows from (19). This proves the first assertion.
To prove the second assertion, the matrix is given by
Then
and hence
Since ,0 or 1, , and, hence,
We are now ready to prove Corollary 6.
Proof of Corollary 6:
1) In this case, and is a column vector.
There are single-link flows, one at each of the links,
and exactly one other flow which can traverse one or more
links. This means since the long flow at
least transverses one link. Hence,
From Lemma 7, we know that . From Theorem 5
we have
since matrix A is positive definite.
2) In addition to the single-link flows, there are two flows
that traverse one or more links. Since they traverse the same
number of links, we have
(20)
as in the first assertion. We also have
Fig. 4. Network for counter-example in Theorem 8.
Fig. 5. Counter-example: c = 10 and c = 1000.
Lemma 7 and (20) then imply that the above quantity is
nonnegative. Hence,
D. Counter-Example
The condition in the second part of Corollary 6 that both long
flows pass through the same number of (bottleneck) links is im-
portant. When that fails, there are networks where the opposite
of the conjecture is true!
Theorem 8: When , for any , there exists
a network such that
Proof: See Appendix A.
Example 4: Counter-Example: Consider the linear network
in Fig. 4 with links and sources. The null space
of has a dimension . There are five
one-link flows with rates and two long flows with
rates , . Links 1 and 2 have a small capacity and links 3, 4
and 5 have a large capacity . We solve the utility maximization
(5) numerically to compute , for .
The aggregate throughput is plotted in Fig. 5 as a
function of q, for and . The minimal
throughput is achieved around and will be achieved
around if we change to be 5,000. is strictly
increasing beyond . In particular,
The example is surprising at first because the conventional
wisdom in networking is that increasing favors long flows
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Fig. 6. Counter-example: x () and x () as functions of , for c = 10
and c = 1000.
which take up more resources, leading to a drop in aggregate
throughput. This is not exactly right. Recall that the price at
a link is a precise measure of congestion at that link. A more
precise intuition is that increasing favors “expensive” flows,
flows that have the largest sum of link prices in their paths. In
Example 4, the link capacity is small and is large, so that
prices are high at links 1 and 2, and low at links 3, 4, 5. Even
though traverses more links, it has a lower aggregate price
over its path than . Hence, when increases, increases,
leading to a reduction in (because of sharing at link 2). This
reduction allows increases in flows , , , so that the net
change in aggregate throughput is positive. Hence, the
counter-example relies on the design that the longest flow is
not the most expensive.
Indeed, one can prove that for the network in Fig. 4,
and for all , as illustrated in
Fig. 6. See the end of Appendix A for the arguments.
In this example, the decrease in allows increases in just
three one-link flows, and yet this is enough to produce a net
increase in the aggregate throughput. Our example actually is
compact in that our proof shows that has to pass through at
least three links (link 3,4,5) to make (see the remark
after the proof of Theorem 8 in Appendix A).
The amount of increment in Fig. 5 is quite small. Indeed,
an easy and loose upper-bound for the increment of aggregate
throughput is . We do not know whether the variation is
small only because this example is compact, or it is small for
general networks as well.
V. DOES INCREASING CAPACITY ALWAYS RAISE THROUGHPUT
We have seen in the last section how fairness, as measured by
, can affect efficiency, as measured by , in unexpected ways
due to interaction among sources in general networks. In this sec-
tion, we will use the expression for in Theorem 2 to study
how increasing capacity affects the aggregate throughput . If
users are charged a constant fee to carry each unit of their flows,
then is also proportional to network revenue. The results here
can thus be useful in deciding in which links resources should
be invested to maximize aggregate throughput or revenue.
Let be the vector that represents the direction in
which link capacities are changed. For instance, when ,
where and is an -vector that has all its entries 0
except the th entry which is 1, it means only link increases
its capacity from to . Similarly, When , then all
links increase their capacities by unit. When , then all
links increase their capacities by amounts proportional to their
current capacities, i.e., link increases its capacity by .
The change in aggregate throughput per unit of an infinites-
imal change along direction in capacities is measured by the
directional derivative of in direction , defined as
Then, from (11), we have
where is evaluated at the optimal rate . In the fol-
lowing, we will take to denote the direction of increase in
capacity (i.e., its magnitude has no significance), with the un-
derstanding that provides an estimate of change in
aggregate throughput when is changed to for small .
This is also important as all our results should be interpreted in
the context of small perturbations that do not change the active
constraint set in (2).
Define , , is the matrix
obtained by replacing th row of by . A similar argument to
the proof of Theorem 5 yields the following
Theorem 9: For any ,
if and only if
Theorem 9 characterizes exactly the set of all networks
, and directions , in which aggregate throughput will
increase, for all fairness . An easy consequence is the
following
Corollary 10: If has only two rows, then
for any and any .
Proof: Let denote the element of . A similar
argument to the proof of Lemma 7 shows that
1) for ,2
2) for ,2
Then
Similarly we have . Then from Theorem 9, we have
Corollary 10 says that increasing link capacity always raises
aggregate throughput, provided there are only two bottleneck
links. Intuitively, one might expect this to hold more generally.
This is however not the case. We provide three interesting
examples, with different instantiations of direction , as an
illustration.
The first result says that not only can the aggregate throughput
be reduced when some link increases its capacity, paradoxically,
it can also be reduced when all links increase their capacities by
the same amount. This is true for almost all fairness .
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Fig. 7. Counter-example for Theorem 11 (1).
Fig. 8. Counter-example for Theorem 11 (2).
Theorem 11: Given any
1) there exists a network such that for all ,
for some link .
2) there exists a network such that for all ,
.
Proof: The proof is by construction.
1) Consider the network shown in Fig. 7. There is a single-
link flow at each link , for . The flow
transverses links 1, 2, 5, and flow transverses links 3, 4,
5 respectively. The capacities of the links are
The corresponding routing matrix is
We increase only link 5’s capacity by 1 which corresponds
to . For any fixed , we can choose
large enough, such that for any all links are
fully utilized. Using Mathematica, the change in aggregate
throughput is evaluated to be
2) The detailed proof of is presented in Ap-
pendix B.
Example 5: for Some in Fig. 8.
To illustrate, we calculate the change in aggregate throughput
for the network in Fig. 8 under maxmin policy . The link
capacities are
We have , ,
. The aggregate throughput is 55. When all
capacities are increased by with . The rates are:
, ,
. The aggregate throughput now is
i.e., it is a decreasing function of . Indeed
.
If link capacities are increased proportionally, i.e., if is in-
creased to , then aggregate throughput will always rise.
Note that even though increasing all link capacities proportion-
ally may be interpreted as changing the unit of capacity, it does
not imply for general utility functions proportional increase in
optimal flow vector or higher aggregate throughput. It does
however for the class of utility functions that satisfy the fol-
lowing condition: for any , there exists a constant
, dependent on , such that for all ,
In particular, this is satisfied by the class of utility functions
defined in (10), as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 12: For any network and for all ,
.
Proof: The necessary and sufficient condition for any
and to be primal and dual optimal are
and
Suppose and are optimal with link capacities . When is
increased to for , we claim that and
are the new optimal rate and price vectors respec-
tively. We can check that these vectors satisfy the the optimality
condition for capacity :
Therefore, the aggregate throughput is increased from the orig-
inal value to . Hence, we have
VI. CONCLUSION
A bandwidth allocation policy can be defined in terms of
utility functions parameterized by some protocol parameter .
We have studied how throughputs and prices change as link ca-
pacities or changes. We then focus on a specific class of utility
functions where can be interpreted as a quantitative measure
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of fairness. We say an allocation is fair if is large and efficient
if the aggregate throughput is large. We use this model to inves-
tigate whether a fairer allocation is always more inefficient and
whether increasing link capacities always raises throughput. We
characterize exactly the set of all networks in which the
answers are “yes”. Though these characterizations are difficult
to understand intuitively, they have led to simple corollaries that
explain all the examples we found in the literature and to the dis-
covery of the first counter example.
There are a number of ways this preliminary work can be ex-
tended. First, we have focused on how throughputs change
in response to changes in and , which is only half of The-
orem 2. The application of the other half of Theorem 2 on how
prices change has not been exploited. Second, the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the conjectures are hard to understand
intuitively and check for large networks. It is not clear whether
this condition is likely to hold or fail in practice. It would be
useful to derive equivalent but more intuitive characterizations
and more general corollaries than ones reported here. Finally,
we have assumed every source has the same utility function. It
would be interesting to see how the fairness definition and the
results here should generalize when sources have the same class
of utility functions but with different parameters, or have dif-
ferent utility functions.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 8
It is sufficient to prove the assertion with the network
shown in Fig. 4 which has . This is because
given any , we can always embed this network
as a subnetwork within a larger network that has the given
and scale up the capacity of this subnetwork with
respect to the capacity in other parts of the network such that
the decrease in throughput on this subnetwork dominates the
changes in throughput on other parts of the network, as
increases. Hence, consider the network in Fig. 4, with five links
. Let their capacities be and
. Fix any .
There are five single-link flows with rates ,
and two long flows with rates , . The routing matrix R and
matrix Z are
where
From (13), we have
We will show that we can choose the link capacity such that
Theorem 5 then implies that for all .
The basic idea of the proof is as follows. From Lemma 7,
we know that , , 2 (strict inequality here), and
. Hence, the first term is positive. We will show
that the second term is negative by making strictly
negative through an appropriate choice of . Moreover, even
though both terms go to zero when goes to infinity, it is pos-
sible to choose link capacity such that, for all , the
first term is smaller than the second in magnitude, so that their
sum is strictly negative. We will prove the final result after 5
lemmas.
Let , , be the link “prices” (Lagrange multi-
pliers) and be the end-to-end prices. The fol-
lowing facts are the direct consequences of the optimality condi-
tion for the utility maximization problem (see e.g., [24]), which
will be used extensively later.
Lemma 13: At optimality, we have
1) ; ; , .
2) , ; ; .
3) and .
Define the following positive constants:
1) ;
2) ;
3) ;
4) ;
5) ;
6) ;
7) ;
8)
9) .
Let . Then we can
choose large enough so that for all ,
, and choose large enough, so
that . Now choose .
Then immediately, the following inequalities hold:
(21)
For any ,
(22)
Using (21), we can have a much tighter bound than (22):
The next lemma gives the ranges of all the rates.
Lemma 14:
1) ; ;
2) , ;
.
Proof:
1) ; , so , .
; , , so ,
. Therefore: .
2) For , 4, 5, ; on the other hand,
since , .
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3) . Then
Hence, and . Since
, .
4) and
.
The next step is to upper bound the difference between
and . The intuition is that by choosing large enough, ,
, will be negligible compared to . Hence, the differ-
ence between and can be very small, so is the difference
between and .
Lemma 15:
Proof: First
(23)
Since all sources have the same utility function, we can think
of equilibrium rates as given by a common function of
end-to-end price, evaluated at different prices:
Using the intermediate value theorem and (23), we have
We now derive an upper bound for and a lower bound for
, which will be used in proving the final result.
Lemma 16: ,
Proof: First,
Using Lemmas 14 and 15 and the intermediate value theorem,
we have
for some
Hence,
For , we have
(24)
Now
In summary,
and
With the upper bound for and lower bound for , to prove
is negative, we only need an
upper bound for the positive term and a lower bound
for the magnitude of the negative term . These are
provided by the next lemma.
Lemma 17:
(25)
Proof: From (13),
Hence,
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Also,
Now
Since
and
we have
By the choice of , we have
Now we are ready to evaluate
where the inequality follows from Lemmas 16 and 17. Our
choice of implies
(26)
Then for all . Finally, by The-
orem 5, for all ,
Remark: If link 5 did not exist, then the coefficient for
would be
Then and the conjecture would hold.
Hence, our counter-example is compact.
As we discussed at the end of Section IV-D, when ,
decreases and increases with increasing , which is the
reason for the increase in aggregate throughput. Here is a short
formal proof for and .
Replace the vector with in (11)
and in the definition of in (13). Now and
. Then a similar argument to the proof of
Theorem 5 yields
if and only if
Using the corresponding , we have
From Lemma 16, we have . Lemma 7 implies that
. Then we have . Hence, for
,
Similarly, we can show that, for ,
B. Proof of Theorem 11
Consider the network shown in Fig. 8. There is a single-link
flow at each link , for , which is omitted from
the figure. The link capacities are
for
for
For the network in Fig. 8, the corresponding routing matrix is
where is a 7 3 matrix with every entry set to 1.
By symmetry of the network, we can define vector as
We use vector to denote the corresponding end-to-end prices
for rate vector .
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Using Mathematica, we evaluate as
where .
Given any , , we show through the following
lemmas that we can find such that, for any ,
.
Define the following positive constants:
1) ;
2) ;
3) .
Let . Choose large enough so that the
following two inequalities hold:
(27)
(28)
Immediately, we have the following inequality:
(29)
The first Lemma here upper and lower bounds all the rates.
Lemma 19:
1) ;
2) ;
3) .
Proof:
1) is obvious. Since , . By noticing
, we have .
2) is obvious. On the other hand,
.
3) is obvious. On the other hand,
Therefore, .
The next step is to get an upper bound for . The in-
tuition is that by choosing large enough, the difference be-
tween and can be very small, so is the difference between
and .
Lemma 20:
Proof: Using Lemma 19 and (29), we have
Using this inequality and the intermediate value theorem, we
have
for some
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 19. Using the
last inequality and the intermediate value theorem, we can upper
bound :
for some
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 19.
The next lemma upper bounds in terms of .
Lemma 21:
Proof: From Lemma 19, and (27), (28), we have
where we have used the facts and
.
We can also bound from below.
Lemma 22:
Proof: From Lemma 19,
Now we can finish the proof of Theorem 11 by examining the
sign of the following quantity:
Lemma
Lemma
Lemma
by the choice of
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Remark: For the example above, when is large enough, we
have . Hence,
This slope agrees with Example 5 where the aggregate through-
put decreases by when every link’s capacity increases by .
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